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We develop a theoretical model of the household where family ties impose a
distortion on the job search incentives of unemployed members and on the
young adults’ decision of leaving the parental house. We ﬁnd that the search
e?orts of unemployed family members are strategic substitutes, the young
adult leaves the parental house only if his market wage is su?ciently high,
and a low wage for the young implies that the mother’s and the young adult’s
search e?orts are low and, as a result, their probabilities of unemployment
are high. The presence of a household good is crucial for these result. The
model predictions are roughly consistent with the Spanish evidence.
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(JEL D13, J22, J64)
1. Introduction
There is a growing literature that studies the determinants of youths’
household formation decisions. The relevance of this issue can hardly
be overstated, since it a?ects household patterns of consumption, sa-
ving and wealth accumulation as well as population growth. This is-
sue is particularly important in Southern European countries where
the fraction of youths under 30 who live with their parents is substan-
tially larger than in Northern countries. For instance, Cantó Sánchez
and Mercader-Prats (1996) reports that during the period 1986-1994,
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this fraction has increased from 53.2 percent to 65.8 percent for the
male population and from 35.3 percent to 47.6 percent for the female
population (see Table 1). Becker et al. (2004) report that 75 percent
of Spanish and Italian youths live with their parents, as opposed to
30 percent of Dutch youths who decide to stay. Thus, the data show
that there is a large disparity in coresidence rates across countries and
their determinants (or the determinants of leaving the parental home)
are not yet totally understood.
Various authors have emphasized the role of the family as an insurance
mechanism against employment risk (see McElroy, 1985, Rosenzweig
and Wolpin, 1993, or Ermisch, 1999, Fogli, 1999, and Becker et al.,
2004). Thus, youths would stay as a means of getting the insurance
that the market does not give them. Other authors stress the im-
portance of access to housing in order to leave the parental home.
This is the case of Ermisch (1999) for the UK, Martínez-Granado and
Ruiz-Castillo (2002) for Spain and Gianelli and Monfardini (2003) for
Italy. For the latter case, Manacorda and Moretti (2003) emphasize
the income of parents who are thought to have a strong preference for
coresidence.
In this paper we build a model in which we jointly analyze the cores-
idence decision of a young adult and the labor market behavior of
di?erent family members. From this point of view, our paper is clos-
est in spirit to McElroy (1985). The focus of our study will be on the
strategic interaction between the young adult’s decisions of leaving and
working and the mother’s labor market behavior. Our work is moti-
vated by some observations about the Spanish economy. For instance,
Martínez-Granado and Ruiz-Castillo (2002) show that the probability
of leaving the parental home depends crucially on the probability of
TABLE 1
Fraction of young people living with their parents
by sex and age group in selected EU countries
Males Females
20-24 25-29 20-24 25-29
1986 1994 1986 1994 1986 1994 1986 1994
Spain 88.1 91.5 53.2 65.8 76.6 83.4 35.3 47.6
Italy 87.8 92.2 49.6 66.0 70.4 82.4 25.5 44.1
France 56.9 61.8 19.3 22.5 36.4 41.6 8.4 10.3
United Kingdom 57.2 56.8 21.9 20.8 33.8 37.0 8.6 10.8
All data as percentage of age group totals. Source: Tabla 4 in Cantó-Sánchez and Mercader-Prats (1996).
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ﬁnding a job, but also that the probability of home leaving is inversely
related to housing costs and to the mother not being working. Anh and
Ugidos (1996) ﬁnd that unemployed fathers or mothers increase greatly
the risk of unemployment of their children but this negative e?ect is
much greater for the mother than for the father. Cantó-Sánchez and
Mercader-Prats (1996) ﬁnd that children living in households where
both parents are working may experience low unemployment rates,
whereas those living in households where the mother is not working,
or she is just a discouraged seeker, will experience high unemployment
rates. Cebrián and Jimeno (1998) show that the level of household
income a?ects negatively the mother’s and children’s probability of
becoming employed, and that unemployment mainly a?ects secondary
earners within the household. These ﬁndings are consistent with McEl-
roy’s (1985) about the US. She reports that the reservation wage of
young adults who live with their parents, and their utility as a mem-
ber of their parents’ household, decreases with their mother’s wage.
Therefore, as their mother’s wage increase their probability of moving
out increases too. Thus, in order to fully understand the determinants
of the youths’ home leaving decision we need to take into account that
their response to their mother’s market activity di?ers greatly from
their response to their father’s.
To our knowledge, there are no previous studies where this issue is
analyzed and so we propose to start with a very simple structure. We
build a four stage model of the family where parents are altruistic with
respect to their children. A family consists of three members: the
primary earner (the father), the spouse (the mother) and the child.
The primary earner is employed but the spouse and the child are not.
Unemployed individuals either search for a job and work in the market,
or work producing a home good, which we model as a public good
inside the household.1 Time is the only input in the production of
the home good, and the mother’s productivity at home production is
larger than the child’s. A young adult can either stay at the parental
home or live on his own facing a housing cost; in either case the young
adult may beneﬁt from some parental transfer of income. Coresidence
means accepting his parents’ sharing rule for family income, but also
1We are not the ﬁrst to build a model in which family members engage in labor
search activities. For instance, García Pérez and Rendón (2004) build a model
in which individual’s search e?ort depends on his/her partner’s e?ort and market
wage. Nevertheless, they focus on the interaction within couples and we focus on
the interaction between a parent and an adult child.
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having access to an extra amount of the public good (when the mother
is not working in the market) that he could not enjoy by living on his
own.
The prevailing family structure arises endogenously as a response to
di?erent labor market conditions and this, in turn, a?ects the indivi-
duals’ incentives to look for a job. Our ﬁrst ﬁnding is that search
e?orts of unemployed family members are strategic substitutes. This
result arises because unemployed individuals receive transfers from
the rest of the family and so, the higher the other members’ e?ort
the higher the expected utility of being unemployed. Second, we ﬁnd
that, everything else equal, young adults leave their parents’ home if
they perceive their wage to be su?ciently high. The minimum wage
that makes a young adult leave the parental home hinges on the labor
status of the mother. If the mother becomes employed, the output of
the home good gets reduced (the home good e?ect) but family income
rises (the income e?ect). This feature of the model deﬁnes two possible
economic environments depending on the mother’s wage. There is
one in which the mother’s employment can induce the young adult to
leave the parental home (the home good e?ect dominates) and another
one in which the mother’s employment induces the child to stay (the
income e?ect dominates). In equilibrium, if the mother’s labor supply
strategy depends on the child’s employment status, then their e?orts
to ﬁnd jobs are lower when the child stays (the perceived young’s
wage is low) than when he leaves (the perceived young’s wage is high).
This result arises because coresidence increases the mother’s marginal
utility of working at home. Thus, an implication of the model is that
in households of children who coreside, it is more likely to ﬁnd that
the mother is also unemployed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the
economic environment. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium of the
model for a wide range of wages. In Section 4 we describe our main
results about the interaction of home leaving decision and the indi-
vidual’ incentives for job searching. Here we also calibrate our model
and show that our quantitative results are roughly consistent with the
Spanish evidence. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
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2. The economic environment
2.1 Family structure, preferences, and endowments
A family is composed by three members, the head (the father), the
spouse (the mother) and a young adult (the child). Parents are al-
truistic towards their o?spring, whereas the latter only cares about
himself. Individuals obtain utility from consuming a market good, de-
noted as ?, and a household good, denoted as ?. Their preferences are
given by the expressions below,
?? (??? ??? ?3) = log (??) + ? log (??) + ??3 (?3? ?3) ? ? = 1? 2? [1]
?3 (?3? ?3) = log(?3) + ? log(?3)? [2]
The parameters ? ? 0 and ? ? (0? 1) stand, respectively, for the relative
weight of the household good in the agents’ utility and for the parents’
altruism intensity towards their o?spring. The father’s utility and
consumption are indexed by 1, the mother’s by 2, and the young adult’s
by 3. Individuals are endowed with one unit of time that can be used
to either work in the market or work in the production of the household
good. They do not value leisure.
2.2 Market arrangements and job opportunities
The head is employed but the spouse and the child may engage in
employment search. Unemployed individuals may either search for a
job and work in the market, or work producing the household good.
Let us denote as ?? ? [0? 1] the search e?ort of individual ?. The
probability of receiving a job o?er is given by the function ? (??) =
? ??, whereas the cost of search, in terms of utility is ? (??) = 12 ?
2
? .
Individuals with di?erent family status will perceive di?erent market
wages, which are exogenously given. Unemployed individuals deter-
mine their optimal e?orts of employment search by playing a Nash
game. Each unemployed individual chooses her search e?ort taking as
given the other individual’s e?ort. Employed individuals work a shift
of length equal to their time endowment, therefore only unemployed
individuals can devote time to household production.
2.3 Household production
The household good is a public good inside the household. By this
household good we mean housekeeping work, home maintenance, or
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meal cooking. We assume that the production of the household good
only requires the spouse’s time. That is, we assume that the child’s
productivity at home production is zero and that only the mother is
productive using this technology. We can think of this assumption as
some social norm that dictates that housekeeping is the mother’s job.
The technology available to produce the home good ? is represented
by the function
? (?) = ?+ ? ?; ?? ? ? 0? [3]
where ? is the total productive time at home production. The public
nature of the home good implies that all individuals within the same
household consume the same amount of it.
2.4 Family arrangements
We assume that the three agents start sharing the same residence.
The young adult can either stay at the parental home or live on his
own facing a housing cost. That is, the young adult can form his
own household. Parents have a sharing rule that determines the mar-
ket consumption allocation across family members depending on the
family aggregate income.
2.5 Timing
To summarize, let us enumerate the di?erent stages of the model:
1. We start assuming that market wages are given. For simplicity,
we normalize the head’s wage and set it equal to one and assume
that the economy wide state variable at the beginning of this
stage is the pair of the spouse’s and the young adult’s relative
wages (?2? ?3). The mother and the adult child determine their
optimal e?orts of employment search by playing a Nash game.
That is, each unemployed individual ? chooses her search e?ort ??
taking as given the other individual’s e?ort. Individuals receive
an o?er with a probability that is directly related to the level of
their search e?ort. This o?er is observed by all family members.
This is the job search stage.
2. The state variable is now (?2? ?3? ?2? ?3). The variable ?? ?
{0? 1}, ? = 2? 3 denotes whether individual ? has received an of-
fer or not. Individuals decide whether to accept or to reject the
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o?er. That is, they choose ?? ? {0? 1}. We model the decision
taking at this stage as if the mother and the young adult played
a sequential game in which the former moves ﬁrst. We will refer
to this stage as the work decision stage.
3. The economy wide state variable is (?2? ?3? ?2? ?3? ?2? ?3). The
young adult decides whether to stay at the parental home or to
leave. Thus, this decision is denoted as choosing ? ? {???},
where ? denotes staying and ? leaving the parental home. Mov-
ing out implies paying a housing cost. This stage will be referred
to as the moving decision stage.
4. Finally, at this stage, the economy wide state variable is
(?2? ?3? ?2? ?3? ?2? ?3??). Agents engage in production activi-
ties and consumption takes place. The distribution of family in-
come (market consumption) is decided using an exogenous shar-
ing rule. We will call this the consumption stage.
3. Characterization of equilibria
In this section we analyze the equilibria of the model. It will be solved
backwards and so we start in section 3.1 by ﬁnding the consumption
allocations that will take place once agents know their employment
status and residence choice. In section 3.2 we analyze the determinants
of the young adult’s moving decision. Then, we move to study the
individual’s job acceptance strategies when they receive a job o?er in
section 3.3 and, ﬁnally, section 3.4 analyzes the optimal search e?ort
strategies.
3.1 The consumption stage
We follow the e?ciency approach proposed by Chiappori (1992), Chi-
appori et al. (2002), and Blundell et al. (1998). The idea underlying
this approach is the following: parents engage in a bargaining process
to decide the allocation of aggregate resources. Any allocation re-
sulting from this process is Pareto e?cient and, thus, there exists a
weighting factor ? belonging to [0? 1] such that the allocation maxi-
mizes the welfare function ??1 + (1? ?) ?2 subject to an aggregate
budget constraint. The weighting factor ? will depend on the individ-
uals’ wages and their employment status. Nevertheless, to simplify our
analysis, we assume that the bargaining process that determines the
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sharing rule of aggregate resources is already given at stage one; there-
fore ? does not depend on employment status. We are just assuming
that sharing rules determining intra-household allocations vary more
slowly than the employment status of household members.2 Further-
more, we assume that the young adult has no power in the bargaining
process.
There are two additional features that distinguish our household set-
ting from Chiappori’s (1992) two-agent one-good framework. First,
the two members of the collective decision unit (parents) care about
the utility of a third member (young adult) who has no decision power
on the sharing rules imposed within his parents’ household.3 Second,
agents must allocate their time endowments between the production
of the (private) market good and the (public) household good.4
- The young adult stays at the parental home
Given the employment status and wages of all household members, the
consumption allocations when the young adult decides to stay at the
parental home are the solution to the following problem:
? (?? ?) = max
?1??2??3
??1 (?1? ?? ?3 (?3? ?)) + (1? ?) ?2 (?2? ?? ?3 (?3? ?))
s. t. ?1 + ?2 + ?3 ? 1 + ?2 ?2 +?3 ?3?
? ? ?+ ? (1? ?2)?
?? ? 0? ? = 1? 2? 3?
? = (?2? ?3? ?2? ?3? ?2? ?3) ?
[4]
2There are no empirical ﬁndings backing this assumption. Blundell et al. (1998)
estimate labor supplies and sharing rules for couples where both partners are work-
ing or are voluntarily unemployed. The sharing rules they estimate depend on both
partners’ wages and employment status. We cannot use their results because in our
model there does exist involuntary unemployment.
3Assuming egoistic preferences for all agents and deﬁning the appropriate weights
in the planner’s utility function will yield the same results. In any case, the young
adult will leave the parents’ home when some minimum utility is not guaranteed.
4Apps and Rees (1997) extend Chiappori’s (1992) work to take into account of
household production. In their framework, sharing rules a?ect not only the con-
sumption of the market good but also the private consumption of the household
good.
? (?? ) = max
?1??2??3
??1 (?1? ?? 3 (?3? ?)) + (1? ?) ?2 (?2? ?? 3 (?3? ?))
[4]
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where ? ? [0? 1] is the weighting factor that determines the exact
location of the consumption allocations on the Pareto frontier. Notice
that the young adult who stays at home decides nothing at this stage
and his level of consumption is given by the sharing rule ? and the
altruism intensity factor ?.
- The young adult leaves the parental home
In case the young adult decides to leave the parental house, the prob-
lem solved by the young adult is trivial: he consumes his wage net of
housing cost plus (possibly) the transfer his parents give him. Thus,
the problem solved by his parents is
? (?? ?) = max
?1??2??
??1 (?1? ?? ?3 (?3? ?3)) + (1? ?) ?2 (?2? ?? ?3 (?3? ?3))
s. t. ?1 + ?2 + ? ? 1 +?2 ?2?
?3 + ? ? ?3 ?3 + ??
? ? ?+ ? (1? ?2)? ?3 ? ?+ ? (1? ?3)?
?? ? 0? ? = 1? 2? ? ? 0?
? = (?2? ?3? ?2? ?3? ?2? ?3) ?
[5]
where ? represents the amount of the market good transferred to the
young adult, and ? is the ﬁxed cost of housing that he faces when
moving out, everything relative to the head’s wage. There are two
possible situations, depending on the level of parents’ income relative
to that of the young adult:
a) The parents income is low, ? (1 + ?2?2) ? ?3?3 ? ?. In this case
the transfer will be zero, so parents consume out all their labor income
according with their sharing rule ?.5 In this case, the young adult’s
market consumption and housing cost must be paid out of his own
labor income.
b) The parents income is high, ? (1 + ?2?2) ? ?3?3??. In this case the
transfer is positive and the market consumption allocation is similar to
the case in which the young adult stays but the family bears the added
5Parents actually would like to receive a transfer from their child in this case.
? (?? ) = max
?1? 2?
? 1 (?1 ? 3 (?3 ?3)) + (1? ) ?2 (?2 ? 3 (?3 ?3))
[5]
h
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burden of the young adult’s housing cost and he cannot consume the
home good produced at his parent’s household.
- Indirect Utility from Consumption
Given the employment status of all family members and the home
leaving decision of the child, the solutions to the above problems de-
termine the value functions associated to consumption in each possible
situation. Let ? and ?3 stand for the parents’ and the young adult’s
indirect welfare function, respectively, at the consumption stage. It is
easy to show that they take the following form:
a) The young adult stays at the parental home:
? (?? ?) = log?+ (1 + ?)
[log (1 + ?2 ?2 + ?3 ?3) + ? log (?+ ?(1? ?2))] ? [6]
?3 (?? ?) = log?+ log (1 + ?2 ?2 + ?3 ?3) + ? log (?+ ?(1? ?2)) ? [7]
b) The young adult leaves the parental home and receives no transfer:
? (?? ?) = log ? + log (1 + ?2?2) + ? log (?+ ?(1? ?2)) + ??3 (???) ?
[8]
?3 (?? ?) = log (?3?3 ? ?) + ? log ?? [9]
c) The young adult leaves the parental home and receives a transfer:
? (???) = log?+ (1 + ?) log
log (1 +?2 ?2 + ?3 ?3 ? ?) + ? log (?+ ?(1? ?2)) + ?? log ?? [10]
?3 (?? ?) = log?+ log (1 +?2 ?2 + ?3 ?3 ? ?) + ? log ?? [11]
where ? = ?? (1? ?)1?? ??? (1 + ?)1+? ? ? = ?? (1 + ?) ? and ? =
?? (1? ?)1??. In the next sections, we make use of these value func-
tions to characterize the child’s leaving decision and the mother’s job
acceptance strategy.6
3.2 The moving decision stage
At this stage of the game the economy wide state variable is
(?2? ?3? ?2? ?3? ?2? ?3). That is, agents know their employment situ-
ation and the young adult must decide whether he wants to live with
6We have included in Appendix A1 the expressions of the consumption allocations
for each case considered.
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his parents or to live apart. A visual inspection of the young adult’s
indirect utility in each relevant case (see expressions [7], [9] and [11])
reveals that for any value of the state variable ? the young adult ob-
tains a higher level of utility staying than leaving with a transfer. The
reason is that in the former case the family does not bear the housing
cost and he consumes a larger amount of the household good staying
than living on his own. Thus, the relevant decision is staying or leaving
without a transfer. This reasoning also implies that unemployed young
adults stay at the parental home. The minimum wage that makes a
young adult leave the parental home will hinge on the employment
status of the mother. Let us introduce the following deﬁnition:
Definition 1. Let the wages and job o?ers be given and summarized
in the state variable ? = (?2? ?3? ?2? ?3). Let also the work decisions
?2? ?3 be given. We denote as ??3 (?2) the young adult’s wage that
makes him indi?erent between leaving without a transfer and staying
when the mother works ?2 houres in the market and he is employed.
That is, ??3 (?2) solves ?3(?? ?2? 1? ?) = ?3(?? ?2? 1? ?) and its expres-
sion is given by
??3 (0) =
h³
?
1+?
´ ¡ ?+?
?
¢?
+ ?
i
1?
³
?
1+?
´ ¡ ?+?
?
¢? ? [12]
??3 (1) = ? (1 + ?2) + (1 + ?) ?? [13]
For simplicity of exposition we do not include the full state variable in
the expression of ??3 (?2). Since the altruism parameter is positive and
less than one, the wage ??3 (0) is positive if the following assumption
is satisﬁed:
Assumption 1.
¡ ?+?
?
¢? ? 2.
Assumption 1 ensures that ??3 (0) is always positive; that is, the young
adult decision of moving out is not trivial in the case where the spouse
is unemployed. Note that it is not clear whether ??3 (0) is below or
above ??3 (1). The young adult will demand a higher wage to leave the
parental home when the mother is unemployed (employed) if his utility
loss associated to home consumption is high (low) and the mother’s
wage is low (high), for given ? and ?. This feature of the model deﬁnes
two possible economic environments depending on the mother’s wage:
one in which ?2 is low and the home good e?ect is large, ??3 (0) ?
??3 (1) ? and another one in which ?2 is large and the home good e?ect
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is low, ??3 (0) ? ??3 (1). The following deﬁnition establishes the region
of spouse’s wages for which each case occurs:
Definition 2. Let ??2 be the spouse’s wage for which ??3 (1) = ??3 (0).
Its expression is
??2 =
¡ ?+?
?
¢? ? 1
1? ?1+?
¡ ?+?
?
¢? (1 + ?)? [14]
We state the equilibrium young adult’s decision at this stage in the
following Lemma:
Lemma 1. Let the wages and job o?ers be given and summarized
in the state variable ? = (?2? ?3? ?2? ?3). Let also the work decisions
?2? ?3 be given. Then:
1. If ?3 = 0? he stays.
2. If ?3 = 1 and the spouse’s wage satisﬁes ?2 ? ??2 and his market
wage satisﬁes
a) ?3 ? ??3 (1), the young adult stays.
b) ?3 ? ??3 (0), the young adult leaves and receives no transfer.
c) ??3 (1) ? ?3 ? ??3 (0), the young adult stays if the spouse is
unemployed, ?2 = 0, and leaves the parental home otherwise (without
a transfer).
3. If ?3 = 1 and the spouse’s wage that satisﬁes ?2 ? ??2 and his
market wage satisﬁes
a) ?3 ? ??3 (0), the young adult stays.
b) ?3 ? ??3 (1), the young adult leaves.
c) ??3 (0) ? ?3 ? ??3 (1), the employed young adult stays if the
spouse is employed, ?2 = 1, and leaves the parental home otherwise
(without a transfer).
That is, the young adult stays at the parental home if either he is
unemployed, ?3 = 0, or his wage is smaller than or equal to ??3 (?2).
Otherwise, he leaves without a transfer.
The proof follows from Deﬁnitions 1 and 2. First, notice that the
young adult only leaves if he is employed. Second, Lemma 1 describes
two possible environments depending on the mother’s wage, as we
have already mentioned. We can think of the ﬁrst environment as an
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economy where the gender gap in wages is large, ?2 ? ??2 . In this
case, children whose mothers are not working in the market demand
a higher wage to leave the parental home than those whose mothers
are employed. This result is consistent with McElroy’s (1985) ﬁndings
about the US. She reports that the reservation wage of young adults
who live with their parents, and their utility as a member of their
parents’ household, decreases with their mother’s wage. Therefore, as
their mother’s wage increases their probability of moving out increases
too. The second environment can be thought of as an economy where
the gender gap is smaller. In this case, young adults demand a larger
wage to leave the parental home when the mother is employed. Figure
1 illustrates the two environments described.
3.3 Work decision stage
In this section we analyze the decisions the spouse and the young adult
face in the case where they receive a job o?er. We start by discussing
the beneﬁts each agent obtains, respectively, by accepting and not
accepting the o?er assuming that the other agent’s decision is given.
Next, we analyze the equilibrium outcome at this stage.
FIGURE 1
The moving decision of an employed young adult
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- The young adult’s reservation wage
The work decision of the young adult is trivial since we have assumed
that he has zero productivity using the household good technology.
His opportunity cost of working in the market is zero and, therefore,
he accepts an o?er whenever he receives it. Thus, ?3 is always equal
to ?3, the index that denotes whether the young adult has received an
o?er. Now we turn to analyze the work decision of the spouse.
- The spouse’s reservation wage
Since parents constitute a collective decision unit, they jointly decide
how to allocate their time endowments between household and market
activities. If the workweek is ﬁxed and the father is already employed,
the parents’ labor supply decision reduces to accept or to reject a job
o?er received by the mother. She will accept a job o?er whenever
the market wage is above her reservation wage, which depends on the
household’s utility gain when she works at home, and this utility gain
depends on whether the child stays or leaves the parental home. The
following deﬁnition summarizes the spouse’s reservation wage in each
possible environment.
Definition 3. Let ? = (?2? ?3) be given and let us assume that
the spouse has received an o?er, ?2 = 1. Let ? (?3? ?) and ? (1? ?)
denote, respectively, the spouse’s reservation wages when the child
stays and when the child leaves. That is, these wages are, respectively,
those for which ? (?? 1? ?3? 1? ?3 (?3) ? ?) = ? (?? 1? ?3? 0? ?3 (?3) ? ?) and
? (?? 1? 1? 1? 1? ?) = ? (?? 1? 1? 0? 1? ?). Hence:
? (?3? ?) =
"µ
?+ ?
?
¶?
? 1
#
(1 +?3?3(?3)) ? [15]
? (1? ?) =
µ
?+ ?
?
¶?
? 1? [16]
Notice that ?(1? ?) ? ?(1? ?); that is, the spouse’s reservation wage is
always larger when she foresees that the young adult will stay than
when he leaves, reﬂecting the fact that the utility of working at home
is greater when the child stays. This is due to the public nature of
the household good. Moreover, ?(0? ?) = ?(1? ?). Figure 2 shows the
mother’s reservation wages in the plane (?2? ?3) and the areas of ac-
ceptance and rejection contingent on the young adult’s foreseen moving
decision. In this ﬁgure, the line ? (?2) represents the inverse of ? (1? ?).
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The following lemma states the mother’s strategies of acceptance for
every possible contingency:
Lemma 2. Let ? = (?2? ?3) be given and let us assume that the
spouse has received an o?er, ?2 = 1. Then, the mother’s job acceptance
strategy is:
1. For any wage that satisﬁes ?2 ? ? (0? ?), she rejects the job o?er,
?2 = 0.
2. For wages in the range ? (0? ?) ? ?2 ? ? (1? ?),
a) she rejects the o?er if she foresees that the employed young adult
stays,
b) she accepts the o?er if either she foresees that the employed young
adult leaves or if he has no job o?er.
3. If ?2 ? ? (1? ?), she accepts the job o?er.
Now we can put together Figure 1 and Figure 2 to study the equi-
librium outcome at this stage for every possible value of the economy
wide state variable ? = (?2? ?3? ?2? ?3). We are not going to discuss
the case in which neither the mother nor the young adult receive a job
o?er since its equilibrium is trivial: the young adult stays at home.
FIGURE 2
The mother’s labor supply conditional on the young 
adult being employed
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- Equilibrium outcomes
Proposition 1. Let ? = (?2? ?3) be given and let us assume that
the spouse does not have a job o?er, ?2 = 0, whereas the child does,
?3 = 1. The equilibrium outcome is that the young adult stays if
?3 ? ??3 (0) and leaves otherwise.
Applying Lemma 1 this Proposition follows.
Proposition 2. Let ? = (?2? ?3) be given and let us assume that
the spouse has a job o?er, ?2 = 1, whereas the child does not, ?3 = 0.
The equilibrium outcome is that the mother rejects the o?er if ?2
? ?(0? ?), and accepts it otherwise. The unemployed child stays at
home.
Applying Lemma 2 this Proposition follows. Next, to analyze the
equilibrium when both mother and child have a job o?er, we turn to
study Figure 3, which summarizes Figures 1 and 2. Recall that the
line ? (?2) is the inverse function of ? (1? ?), the spouse’s reservation
wage when the young adult leaves. It is an increasing function of ?2
and cuts the horizontal axis at ? (0? ?). It is not di?cult to show that
? (?2) takes the value ??3 (0) at ?2 = ??2 and that it crosses ??3 (1)
from below at that point (see Lemma A2.1). So we can easily draw all
the schedules ? (?2), ??3 (0) and ??3 (1) in the same graph.
FIGURE 3
Interaction between the mother’s labor supply and the young adult’s
leaving decision
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Proposition 3. Let ? = (?2? ?3) be given and let us assume that
both the spouse and the young adult have a job o?er, ?2 = 1, and
?3 = 1. Moreover, let us assume that
1. ?2 ? ? (0? ?) and ?3 ? ??3 (0). Then, the mother never accepts an
o?er and the young adult leaves.
2. ?2 ? ? (0? ?), and ?3 ? max{??3 (0) ? ??3 (1)}. Then, the mother
accepts the job o?er and the young adult leaves.
3. ?2 ? ? (0? ?) and ?3 ? min{? (?2) ? ??3 (1)}. Then, the mother
accepts the o?er and the young adult stays.
4. ?2 ? ??2 and ?3 ?
¡
? (?2) ? ??3 (0)
¢
. Then, the spouse rejects the
o?er and the young adult stays at home.
Let us outline the proof of this Proposition:
Region 1: It is composed by all pairs (?2? ?3) that satisfy that ?3 ?
??3 (0) and ?2 smaller than ? (0? ?). Lemma 2 tells us that the spouse
rejects any job o?er in this region. This is equivalent to the case
examined in Proposition 1. Thus, the young adult leaves.
Region 2: It comprises all pairs that satisfy that the spouse’s wage
is larger than or equal to ? (0? ?) (which is equal to ? (1? ?)), and the
young adult’s wage is larger than the max
©
??3 (0)? ??3 (1)
ª
. Lemma
1 implies that the young adult leaves. Since the mother foresees his
decision, Lemma 2 implies that the spouse always accepts a job o?er.
Region 3: It is composed by all pairs (?2? ?3) that satisfy that ?2
is greater than ?(0? ?) and ?3 ? min
©
?(?2)? ??3 (1)
ª
. The fact that
?3 ? ?(?2) amounts to say that ?2 ? ?(1? ?). Thus, by Lemma 2
she always accepts an o?er. Since min
©
?(?2)? ??3 (1)
ª
? ??3 (1), by
Lemma 1 the young adult stays.
Region 4: This region comprises all the pairs (?2? ?3) that satisfy that
the spouse’s wage is smaller than ??2 and the young adult’s wage is
within the interval
¡
?(?2)? ??3 (0)
¢
. If the spouse’s wage is below ?(0? ?)
she rejects any job o?er and, according to Lemma 1, the employed
young adult decides to stay at the parental home. If the spouse’s wage
is larger than ?(0? ?) in principle, we could have two possible outcomes:
1) the mother does not work and the young adult stays, and 2) the
mother works and the young adult leaves, but it is not di?cult to show
that the former outcome will prevail in equilibrium. Since the mother
moves ﬁrst, and in this region ??3 (1) ? ? (?2), she will choose not
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to work because the utility of not working when the employed young
adult stays is greater than the utility of working when the young adult
leaves (i.e., ? (?? 1? 1? 0? 1? ?) ? ? (?? 1? 1? 1? 1? ?)). Hence, in this case,
it does not matter whether the young adult’s wage is above or below
??3 (1). If it is below, by deﬁnition of ??3 (1), he stays; if it is above, the
mother will reject to work when the young adult ﬁnds a job, inducing
him to stay since ?3 ? ??3 (0).
Proposition 3 implies that the prevailing family structure, one in which
the young adult resides with his parents and another one in which he
lives on his own, will depend on the labor market conditions a?ecting
all family members. Not only that, this Proposition also shows that
the young adult’s household formation decision a?ects the mother’s
labor decision. Next section discusses how the young adult’s household
formation decision and the mother’s work decision a?ect all family
members’ job search e?ort.
3.4 Job search stage
This section corresponds to stage 1 of the model where unemployed
individuals determine their optimal e?orts of employment search by
playing a Nash game. The spouse and the young adult choose their
search e?orts taking as given the other’s e?ort.
- Scenario 1: Low young adult’s wage and low spouse’s wage
This is the case when the wages satisfy
?3 ? ??3 (0)?
?(0? ?) ? ?2 ? ??2 ?
In equilibrium the young adult stays regardless of the mother’s work
decision. There are two possible cases depending on the mother’s wage
relative to the young adult’s.
a) The young adult’s wage is relatively large, ?3 ? ?(?2) This condi-
tion amounts to assume that the spouse’s wage is lower than ?(1? ?).
This situation corresponds to the part in region 4 of Figure 3 where
?2 ? ??2 . Proposition 2 states that the mother accepts an o?er if the
young adult does not receive any. Proposition 3 states that she rejects
it if the child receives an o?er.
03 - ANTONIA D.qxd  10/05/2005  8:29  PÆgina 306
a. díaz, m. d. guilló: family ties and labor supply 307
Therefore, given the job acceptance strategy of the mother, the young
adult’s search e?ort will be the solution to the following problem:
max
?3?[0?1]
? (?3)? (?2)?3 (?? 1? 1? 0? 1? ?)
+? (?3) (1? ? (?2))?3 (?? 0? 1? 0? 1? ?)
+ (1? ? (?3))? (?2)?3 (?? 1? 0? 1? 0? ?) [17]
+(1? ? (?3)) (1? ? (?2))?3 (?? 0? 0? 0? 0? ?)? ? (?3) ?
where ?3 (?? ?2? ?3? ?2 (?? ?2? ?3) ? ?3 (?? ?2? ?3) ? ?) denotes the young
adult’s indirect level of utility when the wages are ? = (?2? ?3), and
?? (?? ?2? ?3) is the optimal work decision of agent ?, as analyzed in sec-
tion 3.3. The last term refers to the utility cost associated to searching
activities. Notice that ?3 (?? 1? 1? 0? 1? ?) = ?3 (?? 0? 1? 0? 1? ?), since the
consumption allocations are the same in the case the mother has not
received an o?er and in the case she rejects an o?er. Therefore, the
above expression can be written as
max
?3?[0?1]
? (?3)?3 (?? 1? 1? 0? 1? ?)
+ (1? ? (?3))? (?2)?3 (?? 1? 0? 1? 0? ?) [18]
+(1? ? (?3)) (1? ? (?2))?3 (?? 0? 0? 0? 0? ?)? ? (?3) ?
Similarly, just replacing ?3 by ? , the mother’s search e?ort will be the
solution to:
max
?2?[0?1]
? (?3)? (?? 1? 1? 0? 1? ?)
+ (1? ? (?3))? (?2)? (?? 1? 0? 1? 0? ?) [19]
+(1? ? (?3)) (1? ? (?2))? (?? 0? 0? 0? 0? ?)? ? (?2) ?
The solutions to these problems are, respectively:
?3 (?2) = min
©
??(0? ?)? ?2?2? (0? ?)? 1
ª
? [20]
?2 (?3) = min
©
? (1 + ?)? (0? ?)? ?2?3(1 + ?)? (0? ?)? 1
ª
? [21]
where ?(?2? ?) ? ?3 (?? 1? 1? ?2? 1? ?) ? ?3 (?? 1? 0? ?2? 0? ?) stands for
the young adult’s utility gain from his own employment when the
mother spends ?2 hours in the market and he stays, and ? (?3? ?) ?
?3 (?? 1? ?3? 1? ?3? ?)??3 (?? 0? ?3? 0? ?3? ?) represents the young adult’s
utility gain from her mother’s employment when staying at home and
spending ?3 hours in the market. It follows from the deﬁnition of
03 - ANTONIA D.qxd  10/05/2005  8:29  PÆgina 307
308 investigaciones económicas, vol xxix (2), 2005
? (?3? ?) that, for any mother’s wage satisfying ? (0? ?) ? ?2, the
term ? (0? ?) is non-negative and so that [21] and [20] are both non-
increasing functions, so search e?orts are strategic substitutes.
b) The young adult’s wage is relatively small, ?3 ? ?(?2) The mother
always accepts a job o?er when the child’s wage satisﬁes ?3 ? ? (?2).
This situation corresponds to region 3 in Figure 3 for mother’s wages
satisfying ?2 ? ??2 . Given the mother’s job acceptance strategy and
the child’s decision of staying at the parental home, we can proceed as
before and ﬁnd that, in this case, the searching rules of the child and
the mother are, respectively:
?3 (?2) = min
©
??(0? ?)? ?2?2 [? (0? ?)? ? (1? ?)] ? 1
ª
? [22]
?2 (?3) = min
©
? (1 + ?)? (0? ?)? ?2?3(1 + ?) [? (0? ?)? ? (1? ?)] ? 1
ª
?
[23]
The term [? (0? ?)? ? (1? ?)] is positive, which is simply the conse-
quence of the decreasing marginal utility of income: the young adult’s
utility gain derived from his mother’s employment is larger when he
is unemployed than when he is employed. Since this term determines
the sign of the reaction of one agent’s e?ort to a change in the other’s
e?ort, we conclude that search e?orts are also strategic substitutes in
this case.
The expression of the equilibrium search e?orts in each case are shown
in Proposition A2.1 in Appendix A2 (it also proves the existence of
an interior solution provided that ? is not too large). If we compare
the search rules of the mother and the young adult in both cases, we
ﬁnd that the equilibrium search e?ort of the young adult is lower in
case b), whereas the mother’s is higher. The reason is the following:
in the second case, the young adult’s wage is smaller, which implies
that the beneﬁts of searching are smaller for the young adult. More-
over, condition ?3 ? ? (?2) amounts to say that ?2 ? ?(1? ?); so the
mother chooses a higher search e?ort in this case regardless of the
young adult’s e?ort.
Therefore, we can conclude that when the prevailing family structure is
that of joint residence (i.e.: ?3 ? ??3 (0) and ?2 ? ??2 ), in equilibrium,
we have that a) search e?orts are strategic substitutes and b) the
probability of employment for the mother (child) is smaller (larger)
when the young adult’s wage satisﬁes ? (?2) ? ?3 ? ??3 (0), than
when ?3 ? ? (?2).
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- Scenario 2: High young adult’s wage and low spouse’s wage
This is the case when
?3 ? ??3 (0)? [24]
?(0? ?) ? ?2 ? ??2 ? [25]
In this case the employed young adult always leaves the parental home.
Since the mother foresees his behavior she accepts an o?er whenever
her wage is at least as large as ? (0? ?) (which is equal to ?(1? ?)). Given
the mother’s job acceptance strategy and the child’s leaving decision,
we can proceed as before and ﬁnd that, in this case, the search rules
of the child and the mother are, respectively:
?3 (?2) = min
©
?? (0? ?)? ?2?2? (0? ?) ? 1
ª
? [26]
?2 (?3) = min
©
? (1 + ?)? (0? ?)? ?2?3?? (0? ?) ? 1
ª
? [27]
where? (?2? ?) ? ?3 (?? 1? 1? ?2? 1? ?)??3 (?? 1? 0? ?2? 0? ?) is the young
adult’s utility gain from his own employment when the mother spends
?2 hours in the market and he leaves without a transfer. Notice that, in
this case, the child’s utility when living apart from his parents does not
depend on the mother’s employment status and so ?3 (?? 0? 1? 0? 1? ?) =
?3 (?? 1? 1? 1? 1? ?).
As in the previous section, we ﬁnd that search e?orts are strategic
substitutes since the term ? (0? ?) is positive. An interior solution to
the searching game in this case will exist provided the child’s wage is
not too large (see Proposition A2.2 in Appendix A2). When the child’s
utility gain from living on his own is very large, the child’s e?ort will
be one and the mother’s will be zero.
- Scenario 3: High spouse’s wage, ?2 ? ??2
In this case the mother always accepts a job o?er. The strategic be-
havior of the young adult yields three possible cases depending on the
youth’s wage:
1. For any wage that satisﬁes ?3 ? ??3 (0) the employed child stays.
2. If ?3 ? ??3 (1) the employed child leaves without a transfer.
3. For any wage in the range ??3 (0) ? ?3 ? ??3 (1) the employed
young adult stays if the mother has received an o?er and leaves
otherwise.
03 - ANTONIA D.qxd  10/05/2005  8:29  PÆgina 309
310 investigaciones económicas, vol xxix (2), 2005
The search rules in case 1 are given by [22] and [23]. The search rules
in case 2 are given by [26] and [27]. The search rules in case 3 are
?3 (?2) = min©
??(0? ?)? ?2?2 [? (0? ?)? ? (1? ?)] ? 1
ª
? [28]
?2 (?3) = min½
? (1 + ?)? (0? ?)? ?2?3
·
(1 + ?)? (0? ?)
+? (?? 0? 1? ?)? ? (?? 1? 1? ?)
¸
? 1
¾
?
[29]
In the three cases search e?orts are strategic substitutes, which follows
from the range of wages that apply in each case.
4. Comparison of scenarios
This model tells us that the type of family arrangements that arises in
equilibrium depends on the family members’ market wages. Moreover,
it also shows that the chosen family arrangement has an important im-
pact on the individuals’ job search e?orts. Two types of family arise
endogenously depending on the prevailing wage structure within the
economy. We say that a family is traditional (T) if the young adult
stays at the parental home, and that a family is modern (M) if the
young adult leaves the parental home. The results shown in section
3.4 imply that both types of families may arise with very di?erent lev-
els of mothers’ wages, but they also show that modern and traditional
families di?er critically in the wage young adults receive (relative to
that of older workers, speciﬁcally, male older workers). These di?er-
ences in young adults’ wages may be due to a variety of circumstances:
higher human capital in modern families, for instance, or higher suc-
cess in ﬁnding high wage jobs. Regardless of the reason for such a
di?erence in wages, it implies not only di?erent family arrangements,
but also di?erent job search behavior of all unemployed family mem-
bers. In this section we want to compare both family types in terms of
equilibrium search e?orts. For concreteness we focus our discussion in
a region of the wage space that we think resembles, in a stylized way,
the Spanish economy. We describe the data used in section 4.1 and
outline the calibration of the model. Next, we describe some theoreti-
cal results: we compare the equilibrium search e?orts of the members
of a traditional family with those of a modern family in section 4.2.
After this, we conduct a quantitative exercise to check the robustness
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of our theoretical results in section 4.3 and, ﬁnally, we discuss the role
of the home public good in section 4.4.
4.1 Calibration of the model
We use data from the 1999 wave of the European Household Panel
for Spain. This survey provides information about earnings and em-
ployment status of all the individuals within a household. We have
considered households composed by an employed male head and a fe-
male spouse/partner where there is a young adult whose age is below
35. The ﬁrst panel of Table 2 shows the mean monthly earnings of
employed individuals according to their family status (column 1). For
each member within a given household we have calculated his or her
earnings relative to the head’s and we have obtained the average across
all households. The results are shown in the second column. As we
can see, employed mothers’ earnings are, on average, 73.18 percent of
their partners’. Likewise, the dependent young adult’s wage is 67.24
percent of his (her) father’s earnings. The second panel of this ta-
ble shows the mean monthly earnings of independent employed youths
(whose age is below 35). Table 3 also shows a measure of housing costs.
This monthly ﬁgure is an average of the rental payments reported by
renters and the imputed rent assigned to owners. Finally, we provide
a measure for the mother’s reservation wage. The survey contains the
question “How much income per month are you willing to work for?”
The average of the answers given by the mothers with unemployed
children is shown in column 1. In column 2 we show its value relative
to the mean father’s monthly earnings.
TABLE 2
Earnings, housing cost and reservation wages
by family status in Spain
Earnings
Net monthly Relative to head’s (%)
Father 1,163.40 100.00
Mother 731.55 73.18
Dependent youth 696.92 67.24
Independent youth 952.54 −
Housing costs 266.15 −
Mother’s reservation
wage 540.91 64.38
Source: European Household Panel 1999.
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We use this information to calibrate parameters of the utility function
of all family members, the household good technology and the individ-
uals’ market wages. We assume that there are two types of families.
In both types the spouse’s wage is 73.18 percent of the head’s wage.
The young adult of the traditional family has a market wage equal to
67.24 percent of his father’s wage. We denote this wage as ??3 . Now
we turn to calibrate the wage of the child of a modern family, ??3 . Ta-
ble 2 reports that earnings of dependent youths is 73.16 percent of the
average earnings reported by independent youths. Moreover, Table 3
shows that the monthly wage of dependent college graduate youths is
72.41 percent of the wage of those who live independently. Thus, we
think it reasonable to set ??3 = 0?72??3 . Assuming that heads of tra-
ditional and modern families have the same earnings we obtain that
the wage of youths in modern families is 92.1 percent of the head’s
wage. Table 2 also reports that housing costs represent 27.94 percent
of the independent youths’ net monthly earnings, so we set a value for
the housing cost relative to the head’s wage, ?, equal to 25.73 percent.
Table 4 summarizes the calibration of market wages and housing cost.
Now we turn to reservation wages. We set ?(0? ?), the mother’s reser-
vation wage when the child is unemployed, equal to 64.38 percent.
This number is obtained by dividing the ﬁgure on mother’s reserva-
tion income by the mean father’s earnings reported in ﬁrst column of
Table 2. Recalling the expression of ?(0? ?) shown in equation [15], this
TABLE 3
Mean of monthly wages for individuals aged 23-30
according to level of education and family 
arrangements in Spain
Primary Secondary University
Dependent 628.20 675.16 863.47
Independent 657.63 870.68 1,192.56
Dependent as % of
independent 96.52 77.54 72.41
Source: European Household Panel 1999.
TABLE 4
Calibration of wages, housing cost and 
reservation wage
w2 wM3 wT3 q r(0,S) ((b+a)/b)δ
0.73 0.92 0.67 0.25 0.64 1.64
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choice implies a corresponding value for the factor ((?+ ?)??)? equal
to 1.6438. Moreover, taking into account that the dependent youth ’s
wage represents 67.24 percent of his father’s wage, we ﬁnd that ?(1? ?),
the mother’s reservation wage when the child is employed, is 107.66
percent of the head’s wage. This amounts to say that, for reasonable
values of ?2, the function ? (?2) takes values below ??3 . The only
parameter for which we do not have data is the altruism factor ?.
Nishiyama (2002) analyzes economies where parents feel altruistically
about their o?spring. He calibrates the altruism factor equal to 0.5,
which is consistent with other estimates (see Bergstrom, 1996). In
Nishiyama’s model one period covers about 15 years of an individual’s
working life. In our setup, therefore, 0.5 is a very large degree of al-
truism and we prefer to place its value at most as high as 0.25. We use
all this information to calibrate the thresholds wages ??2 and ??3 (0).
Table 5 shows their calibrated values for various levels of the altruism
factor.
Notice that both threshold wages are increasing functions of ?. Notice
that for any ? lower than 0.25, the value of ??3 (0) is lower than the
wage reported in the data by dependant youths. This consideration
leads to choose 0.25 as a reasonable value for the altruism factor. No-
tice also that for this value of the altruism factor the threshold wage
??2 is larger than one. That is, for any mother’s wage larger than that
level the gender gap is negative, which is counterfactual. All these
reasons lead us to restrict the rest of our analysis to the region where
the mother’s wage satisﬁes
?(0? ?) ? ?2 ? ? (1? ?) ? ??2 ? [30]
4.2 Theoretical results
In this section we want to compare the equilibrium search e?orts across
two di?erent economies (or families). The ﬁrst one is characterized by
a young adult’s wage lower than ??3 (0), which is denoted as ??3 , and
gives rise to the traditional family. In the second economy the young
adult’s wage, ??3 , is larger than ??3 (0) and, therefore, the modern
TABLE 5
Calibration of threshold wages
β 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
wL2 0.94 1.02 1.10 1.19
wL3 (0) 0.46 0.59 0.71 0.85
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family arrangement prevails. For concreteness, we assume that the
mother’s wage is the same in both economies (or families) and that
satisﬁes the condition shown in equation [30]. The employment search
rules of the child and the mother in the traditional family are, respec-
tively, [20] and [21]. The corresponding search rules in the modern
family are, respectively, [26] and [27]. The following proposition sum-
marizes the main comparative statics’ results, which are illustrated in
Figure 4.
Proposition 4. Let the child of a traditional family receive a market
wage, ??3 , lower than ??3 (0), and let the child of a modern family
receive a wage, ??3 ? greater than that threshold. Let the spouse’s
wage be the same in each escenario, satisfying condition [30]. Then,
at an interior equilibrium:
1. The e?ect of the young adult’s search e?ort on the spouse’s e?ort
in the traditional family is larger than in the modern family.
2. The search e?ort of the young adult in the modern family is larger
than in the traditional family.
FIGURE 4
Searching efforts in the traditional (T) and modern (M) families, 
with wT2 = wM2
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3. The spouse’s search e?ort in the modern family is greater than
in the traditional family if the young adult’s relative wages in each
scenario satisfy µ
?
?+ ?
¶? ¡
??3 ? ?
¢ 1+?
? ? ??3 ? [31]
This proposition establishes that, for a certain range of wages (rela-
tive to housing costs), traditional and modern families not only di?er
in their arrangements but also in their attitudes towards work. The
ﬁrst point of Proposition 4 is straightforward since the mother’s e?ort
is more sensitive to changes in the young adult’s e?ort in the tradi-
tional family than in the modern family. The second point is a direct
implication of a larger youth’s wage in the modern family –the inter-
cept ??3 (0) is above ??3 (0) in Figure 4. A larger wage implies larger
beneﬁts from searching. The third part of the Proposition is not so
obvious (its proof is in Appendix A2). In principle, since search ef-
forts are strategic substitutes, as the young adult’s wage increases, his
e?ort increases and his mother’s decreases. Nevertheless, if the child’s
wage rises above a threshold level he decides to leave the parental home
and, therefore, the mother’s opportunity cost of working in the market
falls, which induces her to exert a higher search e?ort. Her opportunity
cost of working in the market decreases because the marginal utility
she obtains from working at home falls when the young adult moves
out. The public nature of the home good is key to obtain this result.
If the home good were privately consumed, her utility from working
at home would not be a?ected and, hence, her e?ort when the child
moves out would be lower instead of higher. Appendix A3 extends our
analysis to the case in which the home good can be purchased in the
market. There we show that our results still follow when we assume a
slight preference for the home good being produced at home.
4.3 Quantitative results
In this section we conduct a quantitative exercise to check the robust-
ness of the theoretical results just shown. Here we quantify the di?er-
ences in search e?orts across family types. We also provide a measure
of the likelihood of becoming unemployed for each type of family. To
do this, we need to calibrate the parameter ? of the search function.
We assume that it takes the same value in both economies. Notice
that if the search e?ort ?? is equal to 1, the probability of individual
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? ﬁnding a job is ?. Propositions A2.1 and A2.2 impose some restric-
tions on the value of ? for the equilibrium search e?orts to be interior
solutions to the individuals’ search problem. A value of ? less than
or equal to 1 satisﬁes all these restrictions. We compute the spouses’
and young adults’ search e?orts in both economies and calculate the
likelihood of being unemployed in each type of family.
For all possible values of ? the young adult in the traditional family
stays at the parental home and the spouse accepts a job if the child
is unemployed. As opposed to this, the young adult of the modern
family leaves if he receives a job o?er and the spouse accepts a job
o?er regardless of the young adult’s employment status. The right
side of the upper panel of Figure 5 shows the young adult’s equilibrium
search e?ort for di?erent values of ?. As we expected, his search e?ort
is higher in the modern family simply because his market wage is
higher. The left side of the upper panel of Figure 5 shows the mother’
search e?ort, which is higher, too, in the modern family. We compute
FIGURE 5
Equilibrium search efforts and likelihood of unemployment 
for different values of θ
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the likelihood of being unemployed as the probability of not receiving
any o?er plus the probability of rejecting an o?er whenever it arrives
(in the case is optimal for the individual to do so). So, for instance, in
the benchmark case shown in Tables 4 and 5 (? = 0.25), the spouse in
the traditional family only accepts an o?er if the young adult does not
have any. Therefore, her equilibrium probability to be unemployed is
??2 =
¡
1? ? ??2
¢
+ ? ??2
¡
1? ? ??3
¢
? [32]
Likewise, we can compute ??2 and both probabilities for the young
adult. The lower panel of Figure 5 shows these probabilities for dif-
ferent values of ?. These probabilities can be thought of as proxies for
individuals’ unemployment rates according to their family status. If
we compare our results with the corresponding data for Spain (see Ta-
ble 6) we see that the model overestimates them, specially for spouses.
We should take these quantitative predictions cautiously, since we are
abstracting away from many determinants of individuals’ labor sup-
ply. For instance, we are not considering participation decisions in
our model, which we think are very important when modelling labor
decisions of spouses. This is why we prefer to look at the ratios in
unemployment probabilities. For instance, for ? = 1, in the modern
family the mother’s probability of being unemployed is 95.90 percent
of her probability when she is member of a traditional family. In the
young adult’s case this ratio is 56.90 percent.
It is di?cult to ﬁnd counterparts for these ﬁndings in the data since
we do not have information about unemployment rates by individuals’
TABLE 6
Labor force, participation rates and unemployment
rates by relationship to household head in Spain
Men
Active Participation Unemployment
Head 6,926.30 66.40 5.12
Spouse 703.00 82.01 5.03
Children 3,146.80 68.71 15.07
Women
Active Participation Unemployment
Head 1,425.00 38.37 11.67
Spouse 3,859.30 42.19 13.95
Children 2,147.00 58.10 20.87
Source: EPA (Spanish Labor Force Survey), last quarter 2003.
Labor force in thousands, participation and unemployment rates in percentages.
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family status and type of family for 1999. Let us look at the young
adults ﬁrst. We do not have data about unemployment rates of inde-
pendent young adults and the category children in Table 6 does not
specify the age of the individuals contained in the sample. Neverthe-
less, we can infer some things from the data available.
Table 7 tells us that only 13 percent of males under 30 are married.
Moreover, only 5 percent of the active married males are under 30.
So we can assume that the category unmarried males in Table 7 is
composed mainly by individuals under 30. Their unemployment rate
is 13.61 (see Table 8), whereas that of children is 15.07 percent. Next
we assume that the percentage of dependent young adults under 30 is
71.23 percent, the ratio of active male children over active unmarried
male. Now we can obtain an estimate for the unemployment rate of
independent young adults under 30, since the unemployment rate for
unmarried males should be a weighted average of those of children
and independent youths. Doing this simple calculation we ﬁnd that
the unemployment rate of independent young male adults should be
9.99 percent, which is 66.33 percent of that of male children. If we
do these calculations for females we ﬁnd a coresidence rate of 62.32
percent and a unemployment rate for independent females of 12.86
percent, which is 61.60 per cent of that of female children7. Thus, we
think that our estimates for the ratio of unemployment probabilities
of young adults are not unreasonable.
7Becker et al. (2004) estimate the coresidence rate for Spanish young adults to
be 75 percent in 1997. Thus, our estimates are consistent with theirs. Moreover,
our numbers roughly coincide with the coresidence rate by sex implied by Cantó-
Sánchez and Mercader-Prats (1996) for 1994 data.
TABLE 7
Labor force by age and marital status
by age in Spain (%)
Men Women
Age Married Single Married Single
Less than 30 y.o. 0.13 0.87 0.20 0.79
Less than 35 y.o. 0.10 0.71 0.34 0.64
30-65 y.o. 0.83 0.13 0.74 0.13
35-65 y.o. 0.67 0.19 0.70 0.19
Source: EPA (Spanish Labor Force Survey), fourth quarter 2003. 
All figures as percentage of age group.
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Now we turn to spouses. Our model implies that the unemployment
rate of married women with adult children at home must be a bit larger
that the unemployment rate of those mothers whose adult children
live on their own. Table 6 shows that female heads’ unemployment
rate is 83.66 percent of that of female spouses. If we look at Table
9 we see that the unemployment rates for women older than 35 is 12
percent, whereas that of female spouses is 13.95 percent and that of
female heads is 11.67 (see Table 6). These ﬁgures suggest that the
unemployment rate of female spouses in traditional families should be
within the range of 80-95 percent of that of spouses in modern families.
Thus, we think that our estimate is reasonable.
TABLE 8
Labor force, participation rates and unemployment
rates by marital status in Spain
Men
Active Participation Unemployment
Married 6,827.50 68.06 4.70
Not married 4,417.70 66.77 13.61
Women
Active Participation Unemployment
Married 4,298.70 42.79 13.73
Not married 3,445.10 45.38 17.85
Source: EPA (Spanish Labor Force Survey), fourth quarter 2003.
Labor force in thousands, participation and unemployment rates in percentages.
TABLE 9
Labor force, participation rates and 
unemployment rates by age in Spain
Men
Age Active Participation Unemployment
Less than 30 y.o. 2,819.60 68.43 14.72
Less than 35 y.o. 4,508.70 76.45 11.95
30-65 y.o. 8,425.50 67.26 6.02
35-65 y.o. 6,736.40 62.66 5.69
Women
Age Active Participation Unemployment
Less than 30 y.o. 2,289.50 57.94 22.08
Less than 35 y.o. 3,557.20 62.83 19.74
30-65 y.o. 5,454.40 39.85 12.82
35-65 y.o. 4,186.70 34.96 12.00
Source: EPA (Spanish Labor Force Survey), fourth quarter 2003.
Labor force in thousands, participation and unemployment rates in percentages.
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Table 10 shows that the unemployment rate of youths in selected Euro-
pean countries for 1986 and 1994. As we see, the youth unemployment
rate in Spain almost doubles that of the other countries. The di?er-
ences between Spain, UK and France are consistent with our theory:
in France and UK the fraction of youths that live with their parents is
much lower than in Spain and, therefore, the youth unemployment rate
should be lower. The Italian case, however, contradicts it. A deeper
study on economic conditions in Italy would be required to explain
this di?erence8.
4.4 The role of the public home good
In this section we want to study the role of the public home good.
Notice that the mother’s reservation wage when the young adult is
unemployed, ?(0? ?), depends on the utility parameter ? that mea-
sures the elasticity of utility with respect to the home good and on the
parameters ? and ? that measure the mother’s productivity at home
production. Table 11 shows the values for the threshold wages ??2 and
??3 (0) and the mother’s reservation wage when the employed young
adult stays at home for both types of families, ?(1? ?)? and ?(1? ?)? .
In all the cases considered the employed young adult in the traditional
family stays at home whereas the young adult in the modern family
chooses to move out. For any value of ?(0? ?) above 0.52 the mother’s
wage is lower than ??2 . This implies that ??3 (0) ? ??3 (1), that is,
the young adult whose mother is unemployed requires a larger wage to
leave the parental home than the young adult whose mother is working
in the market. For all these cases the mother in the traditional fam-
ily accepts a job only if the young adult is unemployed, whereas the
8Actually, Manacorda and Moretti (2003) rely on a strong parental preference for
coresidence to explain the high Italian coresidence rate.
TABLE 10
Youth unemployment rates by age group in selected
EU countries (%)
Age group
20-24 25-29
1986 1994 1986 1994
Spain 44.2 42.5 25.8 31.3
Italy 29.8 30.0 14.4 16.8
France 28.0 27.6 9.4 15.7
United Kingdom 17.0 15.1 13.8 10.4
Source: Table 1 in Cantó-Sánchez and Mercader-Prats (1996).
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mother in the modern family always accepts a job. For any value of
?(0? ?) lower than 0.52 the situation is reversed: ??2 becomes smaller
than ?2 and the mother in the traditional family (as the mother in
the modern family) accepts a job regardless of the young adult’s em-
ployment situation. This occurs because the importance of the home
good becomes much lower.
Table 12 shows the unemployment probabilities for spouses and young
adults in both types of families. As we can see, the mother’s probabil-
ity of unemployment decreases when ?(0? ?) falls. This is so because
a decrease in ?(0? ?) amounts to a fall in the importance of the home
public good and, therefore, a decrease of the mother’s opportunity cost
of working in the market. As we can see, the mother’s probability of
unemployment in the modern family is lower than in the traditional
family but in the case in which the importance of the home public
good becomes negligible, ?(0? ?) = 0?6 × 10?7. We can think of this
case as one in which individuals do not value the home public good. If
we look at the young adult’s behavior we see that in the modern fam-
ily his unemployment probability decreases when ?(0? ?) decreases but
it increases in the traditional family. The reason for this behavior is
the following: as ?(0? ?) decreases so does the importance of the home
public good and, therefore, the beneﬁts of being unemployed at home
fall. Thus, the young adult in the modern family increases his search
e?ort. On the contrary, in the traditional family, the beneﬁts of being
unemployed increase since expected family income rises when ?(0? ?)
falls. Therefore, the young adult in the traditional family lowers his
search e?ort at lower levels of ?(0? ?). Since mother’s and young adult’s
search e?orts are strategic substitutes, the lower the youth’s e?ort the
higher the mother’s e?ort. In the limit, for ?(0? ?) = 0?6× 10?7, this
explains why the mother’s e?ort is higher in the traditional family
than in the modern family.
TABLE 11
Reservation wages for different values of r(0, S)
r (0, S) wL2 wL3(0) r (1, S)M r (1, S)T
0.73 1.39 0.93 1.40 1.22
0.64 1.19 0.85 1.24 1.08
0.52 0.92 0.79 0.99 0.86
0.39 0.67 0.72 0.74 0.65
0.6 x 10-7 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.00
Note: β = 0.25, θ = 1, q = 0.25, w2 = 0.73, wM3 = 0.92 wT3 = 0.67, and wL3 (1) = 0.74.
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We extract one lesson from this exercise. If we abstracted away from
the public nature of the home good mothers would behave as fathers
would do. That is, they would work regardless of young adults’ em-
ployment status. Moreover, young adults would react to their mother’s
working decision as they would to their father’s: higher family income
means higher market consumption staying at home, thus increasing
the beneﬁts of not moving out and not working. That is, the observed
di?erent e?ect of fathers’ and mothers’ labor status on young adults
mentioned by McElroy (1985), Anh and Ugidos (1996), Cebrián and
Jimeno (1998) and Martínez-Granado and Ruiz Castillo (2002) would
disappear. Thus, we think that the role of the mother as a producer
of a public home good is important to understand the young adults’
behavior.
5. Concluding comments
We have built a simple model economy to jointly analyze the young
adults’ household formation decision and family members market work
decision. In this model economy, family ties impose a distortion on the
incentives of unemployed individuals to look for a job and the prevail-
ing family structure arises endogenously as a response to labor market
conditions. The channel through which these distortions arise is the
home public good. The results of our model are broadly consistent
with the Spanish data and can help us to understand the wide di?er-
ences in coresidence rates across European countries. Moreover, our
model points out that in order to fully understand the labor decisions
of married women we need to take into account their adult children’s
behavior.
TABLE 12
Unemployment likelihood for different 
values of r(0, S)
Spouses Young adults
r (0, S) uM2 uT2 uM2 /uT2 uM3 uT3 uM3 /uT3
0.73 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.33 0.48 0.69
0.64 0.94 0.98 0.96 0.28 0.49 0.57
0.52 0.86 0.96 0.89 0.22 0.50 0.44
0.39 0.77 0.83 0.93 0.16 0.52 0.32
0.6 x 10-7 0.44 0.41 1.07 0.09 0.60 0.15
Note: β = 0.25, θ = 1, q = 0.25, w2 = 0.73, wM3 = 0.92 wT3 = 0.67, and wL3 (1) = 0.74.
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Several assumptions have been made that need some discussion. We
have assumed that only the mother can provide the home public good.
We think of it as some type of social norm. If we assumed that the
young adult could produce the home good too, it would decrease the
mother’s reservation wage which would increase her probability of ac-
cepting a job. This, in its turn, would increase the young adult’s
probability of moving out. That is, the modern family arrangement
would prevail in equilibrium for a wider range of wages.
We have assumed throughout the paper that the head of the house-
hold (father) is employed. The results of the model will still hold
assuming that he is unemployed, receives some non-labor income or
some subsidy, and he is not searching. Nevertheless, if the father were
also searching for a job, given his search e?ort, the strategic interac-
tion between the mother and the child will be the same. Given that
the father’s and mother’s preferences and household productivities are
identical, this strategic interaction will also arise between the father
and the young adult for any given search e?ort of the mother. In that
case, the search e?ort of the father in a traditional family will be lower
than the father’s e?ort in a modern family. This result would be re-
versed if we assumed that the father’s productivity in home production
is lower than the mother’s productivity in home production. Although
the model cannot capture the full interaction between the three mem-
bers of the family, it delivers predictions on how the young adult’s
and the spouse’s reservation wages change with the head’s earnings.
In particular, the model predicts that the higher the head’s earnings
the higher the threshold for young adult wages and so the smaller the
probability of employment for the young adult and the spouse. This
implication is also in line with the ﬁndings reported by Cebrián and
Jimeno (1998) mentioned in the Introduction. A full model that an-
alyzes the interaction of all family members is needed. This model is
just a step in that direction.
03 - ANTONIA D.qxd  10/05/2005  8:29  PÆgina 323
324 investigaciones económicas, vol xxix (2), 2005
Appendices
A1 Consumption allocations
If the young adult stays at home the consumption allocation across
family members is
?1 (?? ?) =
?
1 + ?
(1 + ?2 ?2 + ?3 ?3) ? [A1.1]
?2 (?? ?) =
1? ?
1 + ?
(1 + ?2 ?2 + ?3 ?3) ? [A1.2]
?3 (?? ?) =
?
1 + ?
(1 + ?2 ?2 + ?3 ?3) ? [A1.3]
The consumption of household good is ? (?2? ?3? ?) = ?+? (1??2). If
the young adult moves out the parents’ transfer will be:
? (?? ?) = max
½
? (1 + ?2?2)? (?3?3 ? ?)
1 + ?
? 0
¾
[A1.4]
There are two possible situations, depending on the level of parents’
income relative to that of the young adult:
A1.1. The parents income is low, ? (1 + ?2?2) ? ?3?3 ? ?.
In this case the transfer will be zero, so parents consume out all their
labor income according with their sharing rule ?9. The market con-
sumption allocation for both parents is:
?1 (?? ?) = ? (1 + ?2 ?2) ? ?2 (?? ?) = (1? ?) (1 + ?2 ?2) ? [A1.5]
whereas for the young adult is ?3 (?? ?) = ?3 ?3 ? ?. The home good
allocation is ? (?? ?)= ?+ ?(1? ?2) and ?3 (?? ?)= ?.
A1.2. The parents income is high, ? (1 + ?2?2) ? ?3?3 ? ?.
In this case the transfer is positive and the market consumption allo-
cation is
?1 (?? ?) =
?
1 + ?
(1 + ?2 ?2 +?3 ?3)? ?? [A1.6]
?2 (?? ?) =
1? ?
1 + ?
(1 + ?2 ?2 +?3 ?3)? ?? [A1.7]
?3 (?? ?) =
?
1 + ?
(1 + ?2 ?2 +?3 ?3)? ?? [A1.8]
9Parents actually would like to receive a transfer from their child in this case.
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A2 Proofs of lemmas and propositions
Lemma A2.1. The function ? (?2) takes the value ??3 (0) at ?2 = ??2
and cuts ??3 (1) from below at that point.
Proof. ? (?2) = ?1 + ?2? ((?+ ?) ??)? ? 1? It follows from Deﬁn-
ition 1 and Deﬁnition 2 that ?
¡
??2
¢
= ??3 (0) ? Moreover, by Deﬁn-
ition 2, ??3 (1) = ??3 (0) at ?2 = ??2 , where ??3 (1) = ? (1 +?2) +
(1 + ?) ?? ???3 (1) ???2 = ? ? 1? And by Assumption 1, ? (?2) =
1? ((?+ ?) ??)? ? 1) ? 1?
Proposition A2.1. Suppose ?3 ? ??3 (0) and that [30] holds; that
is, ? (0? ?) ? ?2 ? ? (1? ?) ? ??2 ? Then,
1. Case (?): an interior solution exists and it is unique if
? (1 + ?) log
¡
1 + ??3 (0)
¢
? 1 and ? ? 1 + ?.
2. Case (??): an interior solution exists and it is unique if
?2 (1 + ?) log
¡
1 + ??2
¢
? 1.
The interior solutions to the searching game when the child stays are,
in each case, respectively:
1. Case (?):
??2 =
? (1 + ?)? (0? ?)
¡
1? ?2? (0? ?)
¢
1? ?4 (1 + ?)? (0? ?)2
?
??3 =
?? (0? ?)? ?3 (1 + ?)? (0? ?)2
1? ?4 (1 + ?)? (0? ?)2
? [A2.1]
2. Case (??):
??2 =
? (1 + ?)
£
? (0? ?)? ?2? (0? ?) (? (0? ?)? ? (1? ?))
¤
1? ?4 (1 + ?) (? (0? ?)? ? (1? ?))2
?
??3 =
?? (0? ?)? ?3 (1 + ?)? (0? ?) (? (0? ?)? ? (1? ?))
1? ?4 (1 + ?) (? (0? ?)? ? (1? ?))2
?
[A2.2]
Proof. Let us look at the cases:
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1. Case (?) corresponds to ?3 ? ??3 (0) ? In this case, ? (0? ?) ?
? (0? ?) and ? (1 + ?)? (0? ?) ? 1? Then, ?? (0? ?) ? 1? ?? (0? ?)
? ??1? ? (1 + ?)? (0? ?) ? 1 and ? (1 + ?)? (0? ?) ? ? (0? ?) ???
(0? ?) ? The search rules are given by [21] and [22]. So, 0 ? ??3 ?
?? (0? ?) ? 1? and 0 ? ??2 ? ? (1 + ?)? (0? ?) ? 1.
2. Case (??) corresponds to ?3 ? ??3 (0) ? In this case, ? (0? ?) ?
? (0? ?) ?? (0? ?) ? ? (0? ?)?? (1? ?) and ? (1 + ?)? (0? ?) ? 1?
Then, ?? (0? ?) ? 1? ?? (0? ?) ? ? (0? ?) ?? [? (0? ?)? ? (1? ?)] ?
(? (0? ?) ?? [? (0? ?)? ? (1? ?)]) ? ? (1 + ?)? (0? ?) ?The search
rules are given by [23] and [24]. So, 0 ? ??3 ? ?? (0? ?) ? 1? and
0 ? ??2 ? ? (1 + ?)? (0? ?) ? 1.
Proposition A2.2. Suppose ?3 ? ??3 (0) and that [30] holds. An in-
terior solution to the searching game exists and it is unique if ? (1 + ?)
? (0? ?) ? 1 and ? ? (1 + ?). The interior solution to the searching
game when the child leaves is:
??2 =
?? (0;?)
¡
1 + ? ? ?2? (0;?)
¢
1? ?4?? (0;?)2
?
??3 =
?? (0;?)? ?3 (1 + ?)? (0;?)2
1? ?4?? (0;?)2
? [A2.3]
Proof. In this case, (1 + ?) ??? ? 1?? (0? ?) ? ? (0? ?). Then,
? (1 + ?)? (0? ?) ? 1 and ? (0? ?) ??? (0? ?). The search rules are
given by [27] and [28]. So 0 ? ??3 ? ?? (0? ?) ? 1? and 0 ? ??2 ?
? (1 + ?)? (0? ?) ? 1.
Proof of Proposition 4. The search rules in the traditional family
are given by [20] and [21], and the search rules in the modern fam-
ily are given by [26] and [27]. Let ??? and ??? denote the search
rules of agent ? in the traditional family and in the modern family,
respectively. And let ?˜? (?2) =
¡
??2
¢?1
(?2), ?˜? (?2) =
¡
??2
¢?1
(?2).
Then, ??3 (?2) ? ??3 (?2)??2 since ??3 ? ??3 , and both functions
have the same slope. ?˜? (?2) ? ?˜? (?2) for all ?2 ? 0 and the
former is steeper (in absolute value) in the (?2? ?3) plane. It fol-
lows that, at the interior solutions, ???3 ? ???3 and ???2 ? ???2 if
??3 (0)???3 (0) ? ?˜?
¡
???2
¢
? ?˜?
¡
???2
¢
(O). Where ??3 (0)???3 (0) =
? (? (0;?)?? (0;?)) and
?˜?
¡
???2
¢
? ?˜?
¡
???2
¢
=
1
??
µ
1?
µ
1? ?2? (0;?)
1? ?4 (1 + ?)? (0;?)
¶¶
?
1
??
?
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Therefore, a su?cient condition for (O) is
? (? (0? ?)?? (0? ?)) = ? log
¡
??3 ? ?
¢ ³ ?
?+?
´?
1 + ??3
?
1
??
?
which is equivalent to the condition in Proposition 4 (???).
The expression for the utility gains used above are
? (0? ?) = log (1 + ?3) ?
? (0? ?) = log (1 + ?2)
µ
?
?+ ?
¶?
?
? (1? ?) = log
µ
1 + ?2 + ?3
1 +?3
¶µ
?
?+ ?
¶?
?
? (0? ?) = log (?3 ? ?)
µ
1 + ?
?
¶µ
?
?+ ?
¶?
?
? (1? ?) = log
µ
1 + ?2 + ?3
?3 ? ?
¶µ
?
1 + ?
¶
?
A3. The case when the home good can be purchased in the
market
Suppose the public household good can be produced at home or pur-
chased in the market but they are imperfect substitutes. Individuals
prefer it when produced at home:
?3 = log ?3 + ? log (? (?) + ???) ?
?? = log ?? + ? log (? (?) + ???) + ? log?3?
where ? ? 1. Let ? be the market price of the household good. Then:
the reservation wage of the spouse is ? = ???, it does not depend on
the employment status of the child, it is the same whether he leaves or
stays. The reservation wage of the child is ??3 (?2) such that ??3 (0) ?
??3 (1) for ?2 ? ?? and ??3 (1) ? ??3 (0) for ?2 ? ?? If ?? + ???? ? 0,
then staying is always preferred to leaving with a transfer.
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Resumen
Desarrollamos un modelo teórico de los hogares donde los lazos familiares
distorsionan los incentivos que los miembros parados de la familia tienen
para buscar empleo y, también, los incentivos que los jóvenes tienen para de-
jar la residencia familiar. Encontramos que el esfuerzo de búsqueda de em-
pleo por parte de los miembros parados del hogar son sustitutos estratégicos,
que el joven deja la residencia familiar sólo si su salario es suﬁcientemente
alto, y que un salario demasiado bajo para los jóvenes implica un esfuerzo de
búsqueda de empleo, tanto de la madre como del joven, bajo y, en consecuen-
cia, que la probabilidad de permanecer parado, tanto para la madre como para
el joven es alta. La existencia de un bien producido en el hogar de uso público
es crucial para obtener estos resultados. Las predisposiciones del modelo son
consistentes con la evidencia que tenemos para España.
Palabras clave: Lazos familiares, formación de hogares, esfuerzo de búsqueda,
oferta de trabajo.
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